This week - a change of pace. We are featuring a commentary on the war in Ukraine and nuclear weapons by writer Ward Hayes Wilson. Wilson is the founder of Realist Revolt, a grassroots organization dedicated to eliminating nuclear weapons via a new hard-headed realism, not moralistic platitudes. He is the author of the forthcoming It Is Possible: A Future Without Nuclear Weapons, available in September. He says Vladimir Putin is a bully - not a warrior. And that subtle distinction makes Putin is even more dangerous than we thought because he is unpredictable.

Enjoy.

Danger Ahead by Ward Wilson

Today President Putin is much weaker than he was on Thursday last week. The open rebellion of Yevgeny Prigozhin’s Wagner Group over the weekend, and the spectacle of 25,000 soldiers capturing the city of Rostov-on-Don and then marching unopposed halfway to Moscow have clearly damaged Putin’s political power at home and his standing abroad.

But while many commentators seem to be enthusiastic about this news (and it is difficult not to be pleased when watching a dangerous and unscrupulous leader taken down a peg) Putin’s difficulties are cause for concern. These developments have made the world considerably less safe.

The difficulty is that Putin’s Russia possesses weapons that can be used to kill people on a massive scale. Weapons whose effects are difficult to contain. Over the past year, Putin has frequently threatened to use nuclear weapons and the events of last weekend make it considerably more likely that he will do so.

The reason is that weak leaders with nuclear weapons are much more dangerous than strong ones. U.S. President John F. Kennedy, sobered by the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962 (a crisis that brought us closer to the abyss of nuclear war than any crisis before or since) concluded that the most important lesson from that crisis was, “. . . above all, while defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.”

Kennedy warned that even though nuclear war would almost certainly be catastrophic for both sides, when a leader faces the prospect of utter defeat he or she may well risk using those weapons rather than lose everything.

In the case of Vladimir Putin (the minor KGB official who rose unexpectedly and suddenly to be president of Russia), the risk that he will use nuclear weapons is especially great. Putin is, in my estimation, a bully. His preferred method of getting what he wants is intimidation. He is not a warrior who welcomes battle; he is a man whose career has been built on frightening and overawing his adversaries. For him, any reduction in his ability to intimidate means a dangerous loosening of his grasp on power. This rebellion, by showing that one man at least (Prigozhin) and thousands of his followers were not frightened or in awe of Putin, sharply undercut the Russian president’s primary means of retaining power. 

To remain in power, Putin must quickly reestablish his ability to intimidate. Right now Putin’s two highest priorities are to quickly assassinate Prigozhin (to show that disloyalty is always punished), and to find some way to re-assert his power. Putin’s frequent nuclear threats suggest that he believes in the power of nuclear weapons to intimidate. Weakened, Putin may believe that the only way to re-instill fear and restore his people’s sense of his power is to use nuclear weapons in Ukraine.

Putin may well feel confronted by a choice between humiliation — the loss of his power, his tremendous wealth, and perhaps even his life — and using nuclear weapons. Does this turn of events, this recent rebellion, make it more likely that Putin will order the use of nuclear weapons? Of course it does. It does not make it certain, but it is certainly more likely.

In an ideal world, it would be deeply satisfying to see Russia soundly defeated and Putin humiliated. It would be no more than he deserves. It would be justice. But we do not live in an ideal world. We live in a world where the danger of nuclear war constrains what we can do.

The reality is that because Russia possesses nuclear weapons, many of the standard steps one might take to overthrow an adversary are denied to us. It would be foolish to encourage civil war in Russia, for example, or any other set of circumstances that backs Putin further into a corner. It may be possible to bring the war in Ukraine to a modestly successful conclusion, but it must be done cautiously, and carefully.

Holding back from punishing those who deserve it, watching while Putin runs roughshod over the moral and legal standards we believe in, and not taking steps to mete out the full measure of punishment he deserves is a bitter pill to swallow. But those are the realities imposed on us by a world where nuclear weapons exist. In a world with nuclear weapons, bad actors can force caution on us by threatening to ravel down the temple — bringing catastrophe on us all.

If you find yourself straining against these realities, the obvious response is to set aside our seventy-five years of nothing-can-be-done fatalism and unleash the famous American can-do spirit on the problem. Why can’t there be a realist case for eliminating nuclear weapons? Tougher challenges have been overcome before.

In the meantime, though, we must tread lightly, move carefully, and continue supporting Ukraine in a way that doesn’t push Putin to the edge. We must not confront Putin with a choice between humiliation and nuclear war.